In this paper we present a new interpretation of failure, a concept to which a lot of attention is being paid in the field of artificial intelligence research, especially due to the rise of the programming language PROLOG that treats negation as procedural failure. Our interpretation of failure, however, does not originate from research in the foundations of PROLOG. We present it here as an outcome of research on so-called dialogue logics, a tradition in logic research that envisages a logical proof as a formaliz~ed discussion between conflicting parties. Systems of formalized discussion that show the same logical behaviour as standard logical systems can be build. We show how such a system with additional fall operator can be used for the treatment of phenomena that are also relevant for natural language discourse. In the paper the following will be analyzed: negative questions, the paradox of the small number, and conditionals. quite a difference when thinking about the semantics of conditionals, whether one tries to construct models for them, or whether one imagines how people would go about discussing a conditional proposition.
preoccupation with "assertions", being the linguistic counterparts of "facts". Even where researchers start to show interest in "discourse" they concentrate most of tile time on texts which they can treat as a monological accumulation of assertions. We feel that only a theory that also deals with the dynamic and procedural aspects of human linguistic interaction is able to provide a proper semantics for natural language.
Apart from the monological mainstream there is another tradition in logic, taking its starting point in the work of the mathematical logician Paul Lorenzen. Inspired by Belh's work on semantic tableaux, Lorenzen developed what one could call a dialogical approach to the investigation of logics. 2 In his theory, which in the following will be referred to as dialogue tableaux theory (DTT), a logical proof is pictured as a discussion between two parties. The formula to be proved, called initial thesis (T), is defended by one party, which therewith takes up the role of the so called proponent (P), against the criticism of the other party, accordingly taking up the role of opponent (O) . A discussion about T represents a logical proof of T, provided that P is able to defend T against all possible criticism, i.e. that P has a winning strategy for T. Representations of logical discussions are structurally analogous to semantic tableaux. We shall call them dialogue tableaux. At about the same time the philosophical logician Jaako Hintikka developed his so-called game theoretical semantics which shows close connections with the work of Lorenzen.. Game theoretical semantics is primarily occupied with the semantics of natm'al language. 3 Important consequence of the work of both: the view of logic as a theory of formalized interaction functions as a new heuristic paradigm: e.g. it makes quite a difference when thinking about the semantics of conditionals, whether one tries to construct models for them, or whether one imagines how people would go about discussing a conditional proposition.
Dialogue tableaux for formal logic
This section is meant as a very rough introduction to dialogue systems for formal logic. People who want to delve more deeply into the subject are refen'ed to/ Barth & Krabbe 1982/. or minimal negation. Because of its procedurality, failure has been treated as a notion of (non-~) provability. In this way it can be thought of as a modality in provability logics. 4
In this paper we want to present yet another interpretation of failure in te:,'ms of discussions, which to our opinion is a fairly natural one. We want to make it clear from the outset, that this new interpre tation of failure is not an interpretation for negation, as is the case in prolog. We will apply dialogical failure together with standal'd (classical, intuitionistic) negation. This makes sense because of the fact that we do not have the Closed,World-
Dialogical faihn'e is handled by introducing a fail operator t,' into discussions. The operator, applied to a sentence A, could be interpreted as "There is no way to win a discussion on A relative to the present concessions", or "Nothing in the present discussion leads to the conclusion that A". Rules for this operator introduce the concept of role-changing: actual parties B(lack) and W(hite) who play the roles of O and P will, under clearly defined conditions, change roles during a discussion. Winning and losing the discussion will be defined relative to B and W. There is also an extra constraint on the concessions to be taken over from the main discussion: only those concessions uttered prior to the utterance of the fail statement are allowexl to be tanled over.
The fail operator enables us to deal with a broad range of nmch debated phenomena. In what follows, we will treat the following topics, it being understood that their treatment cannot be dealt with here extensively: 
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The answer given indicates who who wins the dialogue: a positive answer means that the last party to play the role of proponent wins, a negative answer that the last party to play the role of opponent wins. In addition a change in roles can (must) be indicated in some languages. 6 An example in case is German (figure 4). figure 4 vv ] "The last proponents wins" "last proponent = first proponent" w I B "The last proponents wins" "bast proponent ¢ first proponent" "The last proponent loses"
Tile paradox of the small number
Using F there is an elegant solution to the paradox of the small number, which runs as follows.
1 is a small number, but there exists a number that is not small if n is a small number so is n+l there exists a number that is both small and not small, which is absurd.
Clearly the paradox is generated in the last premise which allows for the generation of small numbers which get bigger and bigger, thereby reaching the number which is supposed not to be small and collapsing into inconsistency. F allows us to do a precheck on the consistency. If we build this pre-check in the last premise we can prevent the paradoxical inference: 7 . "Do you admit that 1 is a small number?"
• "Yes, I grant you that."
• "Do you admit, then, that if some number is considered to be small, the direct successor of that number also is small." -"Yes, I suppose that that is correct."
.o, Thus a set of seeming concessions is established, from which the sophist sets out to show absurdity. The opponent is not given the opportunity to amend his second concession by making a provision like "unless, of course, this successor is not already agreed to be not small" -which everybody tacitly understands.
It is even possible to give a range of vagueness in the definition of small number by widening the pre-check, e.g.
One can also extend the example by adding a definition of large number in an analogous way. Starting from definitely small on the one end, and definitely large on the other end, there are several distinct results as to which numbers can be called small or large or "neither small nor large", this depends on the exact applications of the reeursive part of the definitions, i.e. it depends on how a proponent would go about attacking these concessions.
Conditionals
Looking at it in a somewhat different way the solution to the paradox of the small number rests on a modification of the conditional in the premises. Or to state it in dialogieal terms: it rests on a/nodification of the conditional in the concessions made by the opponent. We propose to introduce a connective ">>" that will function as a new conditional with the above mentioned precheck behaviour.
Ifi some very important respect this conditional ">>" will differ from the standard connectives of logic: its "meaning in use" cannot be stated in the same way as we already did for the other connectives in figure 1 . The strip-rules for the standard connectives are neutral as to the discussional role of the speaker.
The strip..lule for ">>" that we will present in a moment is rolespecific, however. That means there is a version for the case of an opponent statetement and one for the case of a proponent statement. We will try to argue for this asymmetry. If I strike this match it will burn (tacit premise: if the match is wet or has been used already, or ... then it willl not burn) If it will not burn then I did not strike it Given the tacit premises our conditional will handle all these cases correctly.
It is realized that this conditional as it stands cannot do the job of so-called counteffactual conditionals. 8 But we are convinced that these counterfactual conditionals can be build from ">>" together with formal dialogue rules that take care of blatant inconsistencies that arise fi'om the fact that the antecedent of the counterfactual may contradict explicit information in the premises. 
